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I. Introduction
One day, while drinking tea with Suad and her children in their small 
apartment in Lewiston, Maine, I asked her whether she felt pressure 
from her relatives in Somalia to send money. She chuckled sadly and 
said, “People say that there is a pill called ga’alqois, which means [liter-
ally] that which distances one from their relatives and close friends. 
Before you leave, you promise your friends and relatives that you 
will not take the pill and will not forget to send them money. Then 
when you arrive in the United States you see how hard life is here and 
you don’t send any money. People say that you must have taken the 
ga’alqois pill.”
The “Catch-22” position that Suad describes here—of feeling pres-
sure to send money to her family in Somalia and her feeling that they 
do not understand how difficult her life is in the United States or how 
little she can afford to send this money—is a recurrent topic of conver-
sation, source of anxiety, and motivating force in many migrant com-
munities throughout North America and Europe. Yet in the literature 
on remittances, the perspective of the sender has not received much 
attention. The lion’s share of the burgeoning literature on remittances 
focuses on the size of remittance flows and its impact on recipient 
household, community, national, and regional economies.1
In this study, I consider the pressure that is placed upon Somali ref-
ugees and immigrants living in Lewiston, Maine, to support relatives 
living in Somalia as well as in other parts of the world. I argue that 
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remittances are the glue that holds many families together. They are a 
means by which individuals living in exile, away from their extended 
families, actively fulfill their social obligations and play a meaningful 
role in their communities despite the physical distance that separates 
them. The web of obligations to which they are beholden not only pro-
vides a necessary lifeline to those living in Somalia, in refugee camps, 
and in cities throughout the Horn of Africa, but can also help bind 
together those living in the diaspora. The result is the strengthening of 
this transnational community that exists in multiple localities simulta-
neously. Remittances help families to stay together not only through 
their economic power, but also through the communication and shar-
ing of affective ties that such exchanges make possible. Through remit-
tances, existing social ties may be reinforced and new ties may be 
formed between people who come from the same clan or geographi-
cal area. Rather than serving as an agent to maintain the status quo 
of social relations, the practice of sending and receiving remittances 
should be seen in a more dynamic sense as a medium for negotiating 
and creatively reinterpreting social relationships. This economic trans-
action therefore takes on additional significance; its social function can 
be transformative. At the same time, inability or failure to remit can 
weaken social ties, sow the seeds of conflict, and ultimately result in 
the alienation of the sender from those who expect support as well as 
from fellow clan members or members of the diasporic community. 
Seen in this sense, it can be said that people who send remittances also 
derive benefits from their acts. From the perspective of maintaining 
social capital, remittance sending is not the unidirectional or asym-
metrical flow of resources that the literature often portrays.
Because the practice of sending remittances is so much more than 
an economic transfer of resources, the degree to which the individual 
sender is able to alter the amount or ultimate use of money that is sent 
may be limited. Recent literature on remittances has made much of the 
fact that most transfers are in the form of payments to individual fam-
ily members to meet recurrent or extraordinary household expenses, 
rather than for the purpose of investing in community-level develop-
ment schemes.2 While this may be true, it is also argued that when 
recipients use remittances for health, education, housing, or entre-
preneurial activity, they may be able to impact corresponding social 
development indicators in ways that international development assis-
tance (and even humanitarian assistance sometimes) is often unable to 
do.3 Fagen and Bump observe: “Especially in countries or areas where 
weak or non-functioning political and financial institutions limit inter-
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national access, the desired beneficiaries of development have received 
support far more reliably from family members than from internation-
ally funded projects.”4
Critiques of the position that remittances represent an untapped 
resource for development have focused on the volatility of remittances 
as a result of a recession in the sending or receiving country, fluc-
tuations in exchange rates, and political instability in either country. 
Moreover, because remittances are usually used for personal expenses 
rather than for investment, critics have argued that remittances have 
had a negative impact on fuel inflation, wage rates, import depen-
dency, and balance of payments.5
I argue here that the potential for remitters to divert their transfers 
from meeting the day-to-day needs of individual family members to 
more durable investments in community development may be over-
stated because the social function of remittances, and the rules of obli-
gation that surround them, are not well understood. In reality, it may 
not be possible for most people to dictate how the money they send 
will be used. Thus, when people do send money for community devel-
opment projects, they must do so as an additional payment rather 
than in place of the regular support they send to relatives. Promoting 
development fueled by remittances may require people to send even 
more money “back home” than they already do, and may represent 
an unbearable burden. Given the enormous financial pressures that 
senders already face, arguing for additional funds to be sent to support 
development projects may well be beyond their capacity.
II. Global Literature on Remittances
In the last year, three major reports have been published with inter-
national migration and remittances as their central themes: the World 
Bank’s 2006 “Global Economic Prospects” report;6 the 2005 final report 
of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), “Migra-
tion in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action;”7 and 
Bimal Ghosh’s “Migrants’ Remittances and Development: Myths, Rhet-
oric and Realities,” published by the International Organization for 
Migration.8 Much of the current interest in remittances stems from the 
belated recognition that when compared to development aid, remit-
tances form a much larger source of revenue. It is estimated that in 
2005, at least $167 billion was remitted, a figure that the World Bank 
says may be an underestimate by as much as 50 percent.9 This figure 
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is three times the value of official development assistance and is the 
second most important source of income to developing countries after 
foreign direct investment.10 Leading recipients of remittances in 2004 
were Mexico ($16 billion a year), India ($9.9 billion), and the Philip-
pines ($8.5 billion). The GCIM report points out that “remittances as a 
share of GDP are much higher in smaller countries such as Jordan (23 
per cent), Lesotho (27 per cent) and Tonga (37 per cent).”11
The World Bank’s analysis concludes that despite the enormity of 
resource flows, remittances have not had a significant effect on income 
inequality and do not have a clear impact on economic growth. How-
ever, remittances have been shown to have some power to reduce the 
incidence and severity of poverty, to result in greater expenditures on 
health and education, and to help both direct and indirect recipients 
withstand shocks to their overall economic security. Thus, there is a 
link to improvement in development indicators even with individual 
transfers.12
The overwhelming majority of remittances sent to countries of origin 
are targeted at individual households, either to cover basic expenses 
on a regular basis or to respond to particular needs (health crises, wed-
ding or funeral expenses, dispute settlement, holiday expenses, etc.). 
Tanya Basok’s study of Mexican migrant workers to Canada showed 
that only slightly less than 25% of remittances were spent on produc-
tive investments. Those who are most likely to invest tend to be from 
urban areas or places where development efforts have been more suc-
cessful.13
Remittance levels tend to spike following a natural disaster, as 
was seen following the 2004 Asian Tsunami, Hurricane Jean in Haiti 
(also in 2004),14 and the 2005 Pakistan Earthquake. These remittances 
form what Patricia Fagen has termed a “chain of solidarity,” involving 
“neighbors, relatives still in the country, international humanitarian 
agencies and overseas relatives.”15
Some diasporic communities (e.g., Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria) have 
organized Hometown Associations or local non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) to support specific community-based initiatives, but 
the amount of money directed to these activities is relatively small (usu-
ally less than $10,000 each).16 Margarita Mooney’s work with Mexican 
migrants has demonstrated a positive correlation between the strength 
of migrant communities in the country of emigration and a propensity 
to send remittances for community development rather than consump-
tion practices.17 As Nicholas Van Hear points out, “remittances should 
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be seen as part of an exchange; it is in this link between home and 
abroad that ‘transnationalism’ lies.”18
Migrants are usually more conscientious about sending remittances 
in the early days following their departure from the area of origin. In 
addition to funds sent to support individual family members, money 
may be sent to repay debts that the migrant incurred while traveling 
to the destination country. These costs can run to thousands of dol-
lars, particularly if the migrant enlisted the services of a smuggler or 
had to pay bribes or buy false documentation in order to gain entry to 
the destination country. In 2002 in Somaliland, the reported price of a 
European or North American passport ranged from US$2,000, if the 
passport was to be returned to the person who had provided it, and 
US$5,000 if the migrant intended to keep it.19 These debts are often 
financed through the contributions of members of the clan, and the 
ability to pay these costs may not necessarily prove that the migrant’s 
nuclear family is well off. Many migrants spend years trying to pay off 
the debts that their family has incurred for them to be able to relocate.
As Van Hear points out, it may generally be true that those who 
migrate farthest tend to be individuals who can call upon either their 
own or their close relatives’ personal wealth.20 In this sense, class dif-
ferences can be determining factors in the ultimate destinations to 
which some people migrate. Those who can afford to travel to a more 
affluent country may do so, while those who are poorer, or who do 
not have the kin ties to facilitate their travel, may remain closer to their 
areas of origin. To a certain extent, resettlement programs undertaken 
by Western countries erode this distinction, since very often it is those 
with the least social or financial capital who are chosen for resettle-
ment. In recent years, for example, the United States Government has 
been involved in the resettlement of an estimated 12,000–15,000 Somali 
Bantus to the United States. Somali Bantus are among the poorest and 
most marginalized of Somalis.21
The Global Commission on International Migration has argued that 
the developmental impact of remittances appears to be greatest where 
governance is strongest: “It is essential to recognize that the develop-
mental impact of migrant remittances depends to a large extent on the 
quality of governance in countries of origin and the macroeconomic 
policies pursued by those states. Without sound financial systems, 
stable currencies, a favourable investment climate and honest adminis-
tration, even large-scale and long-term remittance receipts are unlikely 
to contribute to sustainable growth.”22 While this may be true at the 
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global level, Somalia may constitute an important exception. Remit-
tances constitute the largest form of capital in-flow, more than foreign 
direct investment, trade, and international development assistance 
(probably more than all three of these combined). While one can argue 
that improvements in governance might increase the positive impact 
of remittances on the country, the value that remittances already hold 
for thousands of Somalis living in and around Somalia—even in the 
absence of peace and well-established structures of governance—is 
impressive.
III. Difficulties of Conducting Research on Remittances
Even in countries with well-established states and systems of account-
able and transparent governance, data on global and country-specific 
levels of remittance flows are notoriously unreliable. This is partly 
because of a reluctance on the part of remitters to discuss the amount of 
money they send to their relatives. Reasons for their hesitance include 
fear that they may lose social welfare support or be subject to taxation; 
discussing individual and family economic matters may not be not 
culturally accepted; they are employed in the informal sector (often 
illegally); or because they send money through unofficial channels 
(unregistered transfer companies, carried by trusted individuals who 
are traveling to the place where the remitters family are living, or sent 
in kind in the form of consumer goods, educational fees, medicines, or 
other items).23 Balance of payments estimates from central banks and 
government departments use different definitions of what constitutes 
a remittance, as well as different methodologies for quantifying the 
flows. They are generally assumed to underestimate the levels. There 
are thus enormous ranges when citing the size of remittance flows at 
the country, regional, and global levels.
In Somalia the collection of reliable figures is even more problem-
atic24 because there is no internationally recognized functioning state. 
Even in areas where there is a state apparatus (Somaliland and Punt-
land) the data collection capacity of the administrations is extremely 
limited. As a result, researchers attempt to triangulate their data by 
researching remittance flows from both the sending and receiving 
ends, interviewing those who handle remittance flows (money transfer 
companies, central banks), and discussing with senders and recipients 
the mechanics and motivations involved in sending and receiving. This 
article uses these triangulation techniques to a degree, but rather than 
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trying to quantify the level of flows my emphasis is on the motivations 
and dynamics of remittances.
IV. Somalia: A Nation Kept Alive by Remittances
Somalia has been without an internationally recognized government 
since 1991, when President Siad Barre’s regime was overthrown. For 
much of that time, the country has been in a state of war or at least 
low-intensity fighting. The Northwest of the country, the former Brit-
ish colony now known as the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, 
has benefited from relative peace and stability since 1994 and can be 
said to be well on the way to a post-war recovery even in the absence 
of international recognition. It is estimated that between 1 and 1.5 mil-
lion Somalians25 live outside their country of origin.26 Many reside in 
refugee camps in Kenya or Ethiopia, with other significant concentra-
tions in the Gulf States, throughout the Greater Horn of Africa, and in 
Europe and North America. Transnational links between Somalis liv-
ing inside and outside of Somalia, as well as between members of the 
diaspora living in different countries of exile, are very strong.
Although Africa in general is a relatively low-level recipient of remit-
tances when compared to Latin America or Asia, Somalia is said to be 
the world’s largest per-capita recipient of remittances.27 The remittance 
network is not new, even if the years of war and absence of formal 
transfer mechanisms have given rise to innovation in remittance prac-
tices. Before the collapse of the state and the outbreak of war, Somalis 
traveled widely throughout the Horn of Africa and Gulf regions, trad-
ing livestock for food and non-food imports. Significant Somali popu-
lations in the United Kingdom and Italy, the former colonial rulers, 
have also been in existence for decades. Many refugees have followed 
these well-established migration routes, settling with relatives and fel-
low clans people.28 Establishment of large Somali communities in such 
places as Toronto (2006 Census data cites 18,445 people in Toronto of 
Somali ethnic origin,29 though Hopkins [2005]30 notes that Somali com-
munity organizations in Toronto put the number at 90,000–100,000), 
Minneapolis (according to Horst, official figures of 15,000–30,000 are 
likely to be an underestimate31), and European capitals (the 2001 Cen-
sus recorded 43,373 people born in Somalia, but an estimate that those 
belonging to the “Somali community” reaches as high as 95,00032 is 
more recent and has been led by the resettlement of refugees since 
1991).
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Remittances to Somalia are considered to be the largest source of 
foreign currency and the principal import. Khalid Medani estimates 
that 40% of all urban households rely on remittances.33 Indeed, the 
high level of remittances coming into Somalia is credited with hav-
ing helped the country to survive, particularly since 1998 when the 
Gulf countries imposed a ban on livestock imports from the Horn of 
Africa in response to fears about the prevalence of Rift Valley Fever. 
The impact of the ban is estimated to total a loss of at least $300 million 
a year.34 Somalis living abroad send money to relatives living inside 
the country as well as in the refugee camps.35 Those who receive this 
money often further distribute the funds to relatives living in rural 
areas who do not have immediate family living abroad who can assist 
them. It is estimated that 2–5% of rural Somalis receive remittances 
directly. However, the rate of distribution of remittance money inside 
the clans must be high; Medani has found that none of the four sub-
clans of the Isaaq clan has less than 18% of households that receive 
remittances. Among the Habr Awal subclan, which is largely urban, 
living around the cities of Hargeisa and Gabileh, 31% of all households 
reportedly benefit from remittances.36
To facilitate the sending of cash to a country that lacks formal bank-
ing and postal systems, a money-transfer industry run entirely by 
and for Somalis has developed. Money-transfer companies, known 
as xawilaada,37 have been established with branches in virtually every 
place with a significant Somali population. Xawilaada are capable of 
delivering cash to intended recipients within hours for relatively low 
fees (typically a 5% commission, though discounts are given during 
the holy month of Ramadan). One of the benefits of this system is that 
it does not require the recipient to have a fixed and known address, 
since the individual’s clan name and identification are used as a sort of 
address.38 Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many 
of these xawilaada have either been closed or have reopened after revis-
ing their accounting systems to comply with regulations in the host 
country. The largest of the xawilaada, al-Barakaat, was closed down 
and $43 million was seized.39 Most xawilaada are now compliant with 
the international regulations established by the Financial Action Task 
Force and also cooperate in a Somali Financial Services Association 
that is overseen by the United Nations Development Program.40 They 
still, however, play a vital role in maintaining the remittance linkages.
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V. Lewiston’s Somali Population
The Somali community in Lewiston, Maine, is one of the newest signif-
icant settlements of Somalis in the United States, and one of the largest 
secondary movements of any immigrant group. Beginning in 2001, 
Somalis began to arrive in Lewiston; most came from Atlanta and its 
suburb, Clarkston. They were attracted by low rents, relative availabil-
ity of employment, and the small-town atmosphere that offered a stark 
contrast to the urban ghetto that they had come from. In Lewiston, 
Somali parents hoped to be able to steer their children clear of the gang 
violence, drugs, and dismal high school dropout rates so common in 
America’s inner cities.41
By 2002, nearly 1,200 Somalis had come to Lewiston, which had had 
a population of approximately 35,000. Prior to the Somalis’ arrival, the 
city had virtually no experience with immigrant groups. Concerned 
that the number of newcomers might continue to rise, the mayor of 
the town wrote an open letter to the Somali community, which was 
published in the Portland Press Herald, asking the community to advise 
their relatives that Lewiston did not have the capacity to accept any 
more newcomers: “This large number of new arrivals cannot continue 
without negative results for all. The Somali community must exercise 
some discipline and reduce the stress on our limited finances and our 
generosity. Our city is maxed-out financially, physically and emotion-
ally.”42 The Somali community took offense at this display of hostility, 
and many local residents came to their defense. A series of protests and 
counter-protests (one of which attracted 4,000 people in support of the 
Somali community) attracted the attention of the national press.43 Ulti-
mately (and despite some lingering tensions44), the Somali community 
appears to have achieved the upper hand. The mayor, under pressure, 
decided not to seek re-election45 and Somalis have continued to move 
into Lewiston, although at a reduced rate, due mostly to a perceived 
shortage of employment in the area. Today there are an estimated 2,000 
Somalis living in the Lewiston area.46 In addition, a slew of services 
have been introduced to facilitate cultural appreciation and awareness, 
provide English as a Second Language classes, make social services 
more accessible to non-English speakers, and provide vocational train-
ing to unemployed women and men. Several Somali non-governmen-
tal organisations have been established, some of which collaborate 
with American service providers and NGOs. The local mosque, located 
at the centre of the downtown area, provides a spiritual and social 
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focal point for the community. Several shops and restaurants have also 
been opened by Somali entrepreneurs, which cater largely, though not 
exclusively, to Somali clientele.
Over time, more and more Somalis in the Lewiston area have been 
able to find employment. The largest employers include the mail-order 
and outdoor goods company L. L. Bean, which has adopted a team-
hire policy in its warehouse whereby team members need not be fluent 
in English as long as the team leader can translate for them. Some of 
those whose English is fluent have found work in the company’s call 
center. Other employers include a printing company, a tampon fac-
tory, and a bakery. Recently, the Hampton Inn Hotel (in the outlet-store 
haven of Freeport, Maine) hired 45 Somalis from Lewiston to work as 
cleaners and chambermaids. They too use a team-translation system, 
and the hotel manager has set aside space for people to pray. “It’s a 
perfect match,” says the hotel manager, who pays a starting wage of 
$7.50 plus health and dental benefits and vacation leave.47
Despite these advances, Somalis living in Lewiston have had a dif-
ficult time achieving economic self-sufficiency. Unemployment rates, 
although lower than they were in 2001–02, are still high, and many 
people find that language and cultural barriers, together with diffi-
culty finding child care, lack of local transport, and seemingly Byzan-
tine rules concerning entitlements to social welfare benefits, continue 
to make it difficult for them to find adequate employment or to take 
advantage of training programmes aimed at helping them integrate 
into the local workforce.
VI. Remittances: A Hidden Cost?
The research for this analysis grew out of an earlier research project 
with my colleague, Dr. Richard Ford, and our international develop-
ment graduate students at Clark University. In 2003, at the invitation 
of the City of Lewiston and Somali Community Services (a local NGO), 
we conducted a participatory assessment of local community priori-
ties, capacities, and needs. The idea was to help the Somali community 
living in a particular housing development to identify their own prior-
ity needs for community development and to articulate those needs in 
an Action Plan that they could then use in approaching donors, city 
officials, and other organisations that provide assistance to refugee 
and immigrant communities.48
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One of the steps in this process was for the graduate students and 
the teenagers living in the housing development, whose English is 
often perfect, to jointly conduct a survey of household incomes, assets, 
and expenditures. The results of the survey were revealing in their 
very silence on two issues. First, all of the households reported that 
they did not receive remittances from relatives. Second, as illustrated 
in the graph, it appeared that the households were earning quite a 
bit more than they were spending. The average household income 
reported was $1,458 per month, while the average total expenditure 
per household was $1,233 per month. Despite these figures suggesting 
that households were making a surplus, our interviews with individu-
als and the time spent with them in their homes (we conducted the 
entire assessment while staying in the housing development with host 
families) showed that people were barely scraping by. What we had 
missed, we came to learn, was the heavy burden that households were 
facing to send remittances to their relatives.
In 2004, I returned to the community to conduct interviews on the 
extent to which people were sending remittances and their motiva-
tions, and to learn about the mechanisms of the remittance networks. 
I interviewed Somalis living in Lewiston, including those who were 
unemployed as well as business people and those with regular, if 
low-paying, jobs. I also interviewed local agents for the Dahabshiil 
xawilaada in Portland, Maine.
Figure 1. Household Income and Expenditure
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Confirming my suspicion that the flow of remittances was very 
high, the agents estimate that every month they send between $200,000 
and $300,000 to Somalia and the countries surrounding it. This number 
increases during the Holy month of Ramadan. The company’s dis-
count of 1% on commissions and the requirement of zakat (which obli-
gates people to support the poor) result in a significant increase in the 
amount sent. As large as these flows are, the agents estimated that in 
Minneapolis/St. Paul, where the Somali population is much larger, the 
flows might be ten times as high.
More important than the question of how much money they were 
sending is that of why they felt it necessary to send money. Although I 
did not interview enough people to obtain statistically significant data, 
most of those I spoke to said that they regularly spent as much as half 
of their income on remittances. Many people reported that they were 
in debt because they had had to borrow money to be able to send it 
back to their relatives. Clearly, the money that they were remitting was 
not spare cash, and the burden placed upon individuals and house-
holds who sent money was extremely heavy.
These interviews led me to consider the implications of remittances 
from the senders’ perspective. Several questions presented themselves. 
Why, I wondered, are people sending money that they cannot really 
afford to send? Are the demands of their relatives so great that they 
have no choice but to send money? Are they so selfless that they give 
and get nothing in return? Or might it be true that those who are 
involved in sending remittances do so because they get something 
back, something perhaps intangible but nonetheless essential for their 
well-being?
VII. A Heavy Financial Burden
In one interview after another, members of the Somali community in 
Lewiston recounted the difficulties that they faced in raising money 
to send to their relatives. Several people have more than one job, and 
everyone reported supporting several people through a combination 
of regular and periodic payments.
Hassan, a part-time student, reports supporting five people who are 
living away from the core of the family, which has settled in Kenya. 
He and two siblings are living in the United States, and two others are 
living in the United Kingdom. Together, they support their mother, 
taking turns to pay each month. He also sends money to his uncle, 
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who is 88 years old, and two cousins. He says, “The amount you pay 
depends on your ability. Women in the family who have to pay day 
care bills or those who do not have as much money are not expected to 
pay as much.” Still, as the eldest son, Hassan is expected to coordinate 
the payments from his siblings, and to supplement their payments if 
they cannot pay their share. In addition, he regularly sends money to a 
step-cousin who is living in Ethiopia, and to a more distant cousin who 
is studying in Cairo. He says that he helps the boy with school fees, 
in order “to encourage him to study electrical engineering rather than 
religion.” In addition to these regular payments, Hassan says that he 
sends money up to six times a year for “extraordinary expenses,” such 
as medical emergencies, weddings, or funerals.
Like many migrants, Hassan occupies several categories simultane-
ously. Although he is a refugee, having fled the war in Somalia and 
been granted asylum in Kenya before being selected to be resettled in 
the United States, he is also an economic migrant. For the purposes of 
analyzing remittance behaviour, it may not be necessary to keep these 
two identities distinct, since research has shown that once they settle in 
exile, refugee and migrant communities tend to merge and, as Fagen 
and Bump note, “both are important generators of remittances.”49 That 
said, it may also be true that the relatives of refugees carry a higher 
risk of themselves being displaced and living in refugee camps or 
neighboring countries, and thus being even more dependent upon the 
remittances that their relatives send.50
Hassan’s family, having relocated to Kenya, selected him first from 
among the family to go to North America to get an education and then 
find a job that would enable him to support his relatives by sending 
money and eventually to help his siblings leave Kenya to resettle in 
the West. Sending money is his way of fulfilling the obligations of an 
eldest son. Just as he would be expected to take on a leadership role 
in the family had he not migrated, particularly after the death of his 
father, he continues to exercise his leadership from afar by sending 
support to his relatives.
Hassan is lucky, in a sense, that he is not yet married; if he were, 
he would have to balance his obligations to his own family with the 
commitments that both he and his wife would have for her family as 
well. Married couples find it extremely difficult to meet their families’ 
expectations of them, yet most strive to do so anyway.
Mohamed, who lives in Lewiston with his wife and their three chil-
dren, says that he feels constantly under pressure to send money to 
both his and his wife’s relatives for regular and emergency needs. 
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He says, “Everyone has caller ID; if someone calls and you see ‘Out 
of Area’ [on the display], you don’t answer. If the phone rings after 
midnight, you don’t answer because you know it is your relatives call-
ing from Africa.” Despite his efforts to joke about trying to duck his 
responsibilities, he admits that he will always respond to the calls if he 
can.
For married couples, at least two lineages (the wife’s parents and 
her father’s lineage and the husband’s parents and his father’s lineage) 
depend on the money they send. This can put strain on the marriage 
because each partner pressures the other to send money to his/her side 
of the family. Some couples divorce because they cannot agree on who 
to give money to and how to divide the money that is available for 
remitting. Sometimes women take it upon themselves to make sure 
that their own relatives are not overlooked when it comes to receiv-
ing remittances. In traditional Somali society a range of institutions 
help individuals to save money, and these have been adapted to life 
in North America. Amina, Mohamed’s wife, says that she belongs to a 
hagbad, a savings association into which each member contributes an 
amount of money monthly. Then members take turns collecting the 
total pool of money each month. A hagbad is often made up of women 
who share clan ties, who live in the same neighborhood, or who work 
together. Amina says, “If I need money for a family emergency, I may 
borrow from my hagbad [i.e., from individual members], or ask for my 
turn [to collect the pool] to come earlier. They will never refuse me. 
Why should I tell my husband [if I take my turn earlier]? It is only the 
same $50 that I am giving every month. I don’t even tell him what I do 
with it.” Amina said that she feels such steps are necessary to make 
sure that she is able to live up to her family’s expectations of her, par-
ticularly when her husband is also feeling pressure from his relatives. 
In such cases, he would be more likely to respond to demands from his 
own family first, since in this patriarchal system (in anthropological 
terms, a patrilineal system, in which identity, inheritance, and social 
standing are passed through the father’s side of the family) his duties 
to his own birth family are considered the most important.
Not only do people send money to their relatives in and around 
Somalia, they also send to those living in the diaspora who are fac-
ing extraordinary financial hardship. These payments help to support 
transnational ties between relatives living in different localities abroad. 
Mohamed recalls a woman in London who needed an operation. His 
uncle, who is recognized as a leader of the subclan even though he is 
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living in the United States, mobilized individual contributions of $100 
each, and in this way, raised $3,000–4,000 for her. Mohamed laments 
the fact that his uncle is so senior in the clan, for it means that he also is 
looked upon to provide for clansmen and women whom he might not 
be obliged to help if his family did not have such a high social stand-
ing.
VIII. Remittances Bring Shifts in Gender Relations
Women’s participation in the remittance network has been increasing 
as more women have found employment in and around Lewiston. 
Several women interviewed say that they send money not only to rela-
tives, but also, if they are able, to their mosques in the area of origin 
and to support other community projects. Suad thinks that women are 
more reliable remitters because they know how to budget better:
During the war, and in the refugee camp, women had to plan how to 
make the food last. They know what it is to plan. Here [in the United 
States], you get food stamps, which are supposed to be a supplement to 
your income. But if you are very careful, you can get all your food from 
your food stamps. You can buy flour instead of an expensive loaf of 
bread, and then you can save money. Then when you get cash, you can 
send it home.
Women are resourceful in other ways as well. They may pool their 
food stamps or cash with other households in order to buy in bulk, 
which is cheaper and allows them to shop less frequently.
Somali entrepreneurship, for which they are renowned, also extends 
to finding ways to make money to send home. Zahra explained, 
“Instead of sending my $2,000 tax return home, I might buy a carpet 
or furniture or clothes with it and sell them here. People will buy them 
and I might be able to make $4,000 from the investment, but people 
don’t pay all at once. They might pay little by little, through the year. 
So as I get $30 or $50 from them I will send it to my family.”
Women’s increasing role in sending remittances has led to shifts in 
the overall social structure and in relations between men and women. 
It has opened doors to participation in clan matters that were once 
accessible only to men. Women in Lewiston report that some of them 
are now able to take part in the diya system, a dispute resolution and 
social safety net mechanism whereby the clan looks after its members.51 
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Since very often women are in a better position than men to contribute 
to such things as compensation for a crime committed, or a dowry for a 
girl about to be wed, they are beginning to play a role in the diya. This 
echoes changes in gender relations inside Somalia as well, where dur-
ing the war women assumed the position of chief breadwinner of the 
household and thus have greater control over economic matters affect-
ing the household. However, the changes have yet to have a significant 
effect on women’s involvement in public politics.
IX. Unable to Pay: The Path to Social Exclusion
According to Somalis in Lewiston, one of the reasons that pressure on 
those living in the diaspora to send money to their relatives is so great 
is because people living in and around Somalia do not understand how 
difficult it is to earn a decent living in the West. Kaltun, whose mother 
and close relatives live in Ethiopia’s Somali region, says that she tries 
to send as much money as she can as often as she can. She recalls, “I 
once sent my mother $300 and she refused to take it, saying it was too 
little. I could live on that much money! It is more than 2500 birr [in 
Ethiopian currency], and a Doctor’s salary is 500 birr… [But] she has 
twelve people living with her (four children of her brother who died 
and seven grandchildren and one other [child of one of her siblings]. I 
am the only child who is outside, so she depends on me, but she thinks 
that I have more money than I really do. I want to bring her here to 
show her how we live. She won’t want to stay. But at least she will see 
how difficult it is for me. I worry so much, I have so much stress about 
being able to earn enough money that I have gained a lot of weight. If I 
went back I would lose it I am sure.”
She laments the fact that she is not able to send as much money as 
her family expects from her. “We all act a little like ga’alqois when we 
come here, because we can’t help everyone so we have to turn away 
from some people.” This is clearly a source of great strain for her and 
for others who are unable to live up to the expectations of their rela-
tives.
Being able to participate in the economic life of one’s family, not 
only the nuclear family, but the clan and subclan as well, helps people 
feel that despite the distance that separates them from their relatives, 
they still play an instrumental role in the functioning of the family. 
Not being able to take part in these transactions, or not being able to 
live up to the sometimes unrealistic expectations that the family has 
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of the migrant, is a source of great shame, which may come not only 
from those who expect but do not receive remittances, but also from 
members of the diasporic community (particularly one’s clans people) 
who can see that the person is not fulfilling his or her obligations.52 As 
Karen Jacobsen observes:
[T]he diaspora network is far-flung and likely to be present in the coun-
try where the refugee scout settles; thus, there is no escaping its watchful 
eye, unless she changes her identity or cuts all contact with the network 
(which some do, at great cost). Like economic migrants, refugees desire 
to retain contact, increase their social status, and preserve their dignity 
before the gaze of their community—whether this community is part 
of the diaspora or in the country of origin. The community notices who 
sends and who does not, and remittances are a way to exhibit connec-
tions.53
So great is the desire to demonstrate one’s commitment and to enhance 
one’s social standing that some people reportedly misrepresent them-
selves to their relatives in the country of origin, telling them that they 
earn more money or have an easier life than they really do, even if this 
means that the expectations to send more money will be greater.
Not only do remittances serve as the glue to hold together existing 
kinship ties that have been stretched through physical distance, they 
also help fortify ties that have been forged in exile and, in that sense, 
are transformative. Marriages between Somalis in the diaspora bring 
new obligations, not only to the nuclear family that is being formed, 
but to the extended kin of each spouse. Failure to provide in the way 
that is expected from the spouse’s family can impact the security of the 
marriage itself, and can lead to divorce.54
The “payback” that being able to remit can bring to these senders 
includes security in the knowledge that they are fulfilling the expecta-
tions of the family, as well as increased prestige and respect from the 
clan for not forgetting their responsibilities and for continuing to play 
an important role in the clan community. As intangible as these ben-
efits may seem, their importance to the senders must not be underesti-
mated. Hassan and Mohamed list the common problems encountered 
by those who are not able to send money to their relatives. “People 
may suffer from depression, marital tensions that may even lead to 
divorce, drinking and drug problems, and a general feeling of alien-
ation from their family.” Stephanie Riak Akuei’s study of the Suda-
nese Dinka communities in Cairo and the United States found similar 
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effects among those who were unable to remit sufficiently.55 People 
may at first make fewer visits to see their family and eventually they 
may stop communicating with them altogether.
Hassan illustrates the point about feeling alienated due to the inabil-
ity to provide support to relatives with a personal tale. Recently, return-
ing to the United States from a trip to South Africa, he stopped over in 
Nairobi to see his family. He had brought what he thought was enough 
money for a ten-week visit. However, after the fourth week, he had 
given away all of his money. He said, “Everyone expects a visit and 
you never come empty-handed. So I didn’t visit them because I had 
nothing and they became angry with me. I used to avoid the mosque 
at BBC time [5:30 p.m., when the BBC Somali Service is broadcast, and 
people gather together to listen to the news]. I also took off my glasses 
and wore a dirty mawiis (a sarong, commonly worn by Somali men) so 
as not to be identified as an American Somali” (Reer Lewiston56). Upon 
his return, he decided that it would be a long while before he visited 
his family there again. Somali identity is inextricably tied to clan, sub-
clan, and family ties, so the more an individual is alienated from these 
institutions, the more troubled they may feel. As soon as he received 
his Master’s degree, despite his interest in going on to complete a 
Ph.D., Hassan began to hunt for a job to be better able to support his 
family.
The choice that Hassan feels obliged to make—to sacrifice his fur-
ther study in order to support his family—is typical of many of those I 
interviewed. Ayaan, a woman who had been going to the local commu-
nity college to study nursing, ultimately gave up her studies because 
she could not afford the tuition and time required to study since her 
mother was waiting for her to send her money so that she could also 
immigrate to the United States. Jacobsen points out that not only are 
people unable to gain further education, they may also be unable to 
improve their language or vocational skills (even if these might help 
to bring greater financial reward in the longer term) because of their 
obligations. They are also unable to accumulate any savings. “With-
out savings,” she notes, “the slightest setback—a car needing repairs, 
an unexpected hospital bill, a reduction in work hours—can trigger a 
financial crisis.”57
Even those who are able to send a limited amount of money report 
feeling bothered that they cannot send more. Nechma recalls the early 
days of living in the United States thus: “At first, I could not enjoy 
myself here. I would go out to eat and I couldn’t eat my meal because 
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I felt so guilty for spending the money. I would go to a movie and not 
pay attention to the film because I was so disturbed. Gradually you 
become more used to it, but this life is hard.”
The difficulty is compounded by what Somalis in Lewiston (and 
elsewhere58) refer to as an unrealistic expectation of what life in the 
United States is like. Just as Kaltun’s mother expected that she should 
be able to send more than $300 a month, others report that their rela-
tives are rarely satisfied with what they receive. When they respond 
to requests for additional money (to meet one-off expenses like wed-
dings) saying that they cannot afford to send more, the relatives mak-
ing the request frequently do not believe that they could actually be so 
short of spare cash.
The demands on Somalis living in Lewiston also include the expec-
tation that they will eventually sponsor and finance their relatives to 
come join them. Except for the few people who are chosen for resettle-
ment by the United States government, such family reunification is 
usually prohibitively expensive. Airfare alone from Somalia, Ethiopia, 
or Kenya can be $1,500–$3,000 per person. While countries of asylum in 
theory grant family reunification visas to immediate relatives (includ-
ing children, spouses, and sometimes parents or siblings), many of the 
Somalis I interviewed said that they had entered the country illegally, 
by using a false passport, using the services of a smuggler, or posing 
as a member of someone else’s family59 and thus are not able to benefit 
from these family reunification provisions. Instead, they must pay as 
much as $5,000 for a U.S. or European passport, and then often in addi-
tion pay up to $5,000 for a smuggler to help bring them into the coun-
try, with no guarantee that the smuggler will be successful and that 
they will not lose their money if the relative is caught and prevented 
from entering.60
X. Fungibility of Remittances: 
A Potential Resource for Development?
A recurring message in the literature on remittances is the notion that 
remittance transfers represent a potential major source of develop-
ment financing. Such thinking poses an obvious danger in that it may 
serve as a disincentive to development agencies to increase or even just 
maintain current funding levels, if there is a belief that remittances can 
be maximised. In addition, this line of argument ignores the real pres-
sures that people are put under to send what they can to their relatives. 
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Furthermore, it overstates the sender’s ability to control what happens 
to the funds once they have been received.
The literature shows that throughout the world, the most common 
use of remittances is to support basic requirements at the household 
level. Money may be used to purchase food, pay housing costs and 
school fees, and cover basic healthcare expenses. Recipients commonly 
share the money they receive with other relatives and neighbors, either 
in cash or by helping to support them with food. Sometimes, however, 
the recipient spends the money on things that the sender finds objec-
tionable. In such cases, there is little that the sender can do. Nechma 
says she knows that when she sends money to her father, he often 
buys qat (a mildly narcotic plant chewed by many men, and some 
women, throughout the Horn of Africa and Yemen) and invites his 
friends to come to his house to chew it with him. Her response has 
been to send money to both her mother and father, so that her mother 
can buy the household items that she needs, even if her father buys qat 
for his friends. Having the resources to invite friends and clansmen to 
sit and chew qat is a demonstration of hospitality that is expected of a 
senior man in the clan; indeed, it is a necessary ingredient of many clan 
gatherings that are called to settle disputes or make decisions that will 
affect the clan family. Through hosting such events her father is able to 
maintain his dignity and standing within the clan. “What am I going to 
do?,” Nechma asks rhetorically, “I am not going to tell him not to buy 
qat with it; all I can do is try to make sure that my mother is able to care 
for the family as well.”
Hassan, who funds his cousin’s studies in Egypt, says, “I try to sup-
port investments in people that will have a lasting impact as much as 
I can.” Having said this, he realizes that he is not able to dictate what 
people will do with the money, and unless he goes to visit the relatives 
often, he may not even know what they do with it. Ahmed, a friend of 
mine who has returned to live in Somalia after several years in Kenya, 
told me in an e-mail, “It is difficult for the remittances to be redirected 
to development purposes at this end because the mindset and mecha-
nism to draw from the flow of transactions that represent the remit-
tances simply does not exist.”
When remittances are used for community development purposes, 
it is usually because the sender has made the payment directly to the 
cause rather than funneled it through his or her family. The Edna Aden 
Maternity Hospital in Hargeisa, for instance, was initially constructed 
by the personal pension of its founder, former First Lady of Somalia 
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and current Foreign Minister of Somaliland Edna Aden Ismail. Soma-
lia’s first woman nurse, Edna had worked for the World Health Organ-
isation for thirty years before retiring to build the hospital. However, 
her pension could not cover all of the costs. Much of the construction, 
as well as the running costs of the hospital (which provides free health 
care to women as well as training to nurses) has been provided by 
contributions from the diaspora in addition to irregular funding from 
international organisations. Two new universities in Somaliland, Burao 
University, located in the town for which it is named, and Amoud Uni-
versity in Boroma, have benefited from substantial donations from 
Somali communities abroad. Contributions from the diaspora have 
been collected to finance the reconstruction of bridges damaged by 
flooding in Burao and Hargeisa as well.
In the political sector, the parliamentary elections in 2005 were 
largely funded by contributions from the diaspora. Many people 
found contributing in this way to national politics to be a meaningful 
way of playing a constructive role in the formalization of the govern-
ment apparatus. Candidates of the three major parties received signifi-
cant funding from abroad through clan backing. Increasingly parties 
are moving away from their clan affiliations and successfully seeking 
cross-clan support. Somaliland can now claim to have the only parlia-
ment in Africa in which the legislature is controlled by a party that is 
different from that of the Head of State.
Just as remittances can be used to support positive community 
development initiatives and peace-building efforts, they can also be 
used to fuel conflict. This is a point often overlooked in the literature 
on remittances even though, as Van Hear points out, Paul Collier’s 
work at the World Bank on the factors that predispose a country to 
civil war identifies the existence of a large diaspora as an important 
risk factor.61 One of the few exceptions is a report by Van Hear and 
colleagues, which notes that remittances from the Tamil diaspora have 
been used to support the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and that 
conflicts inside India have been partially supported with funds from 
the Indian diaspora.62 The Somali civil war, which at the time of writ-
ing was experiencing a resurgence in the South, is thought to be largely 
financed by contributions from abroad. Some of this funding comes 
from governments and foundations. Different branches of the jihad-
ist movement, for instance, receive funding from a variety of militant, 
non-Somali Islamist sources based in other countries. However, some 
Somali individuals send money to support the continuation of the war 
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and to pay the living expenses of their relatives so that they will be 
able to participate in the fighting. This is not to say that most, or even 
a very large percentage of, remittances are intended to be used to fuel 
conflict; rather, the point is to show that remittances do not have only a 
positive effect on the country of origin.
XI. Conclusion: The Future of Development-Oriented Remittances
In order for remittances to constitute an effective source of develop-
ment assistance, at least one of two conditions must be met: (a) sending 
communities experience a marked increase in income such that they 
are able to send more money; or (b) recipients experience a marked 
increase in living conditions so that they do not require as much sup-
port for basic subsistence from abroad. Neither of these scenarios is 
likely any time soon in Somalia, where Somalis continue to face the 
insecurities of chronic civil war and the absence of a state that is both 
stable and internationally recognized. Despite the effectiveness of some 
local administrative structures, the absence of an internationally recog-
nized and supported state has meant that there is virtually no source 
of credit or finance for investment, or regulatory protection. With-
out valid travel documents (all legitimate Somali passports have now 
expired so people must travel using passports from adopted countries, 
travel documents issued to refugees, or forged documents), travel and 
communication is made much more difficult. Finally, fifteen years of 
state failure, sporadic war, and generalized insecurity has discouraged 
most donors from providing the kind of substantial reconstruction 
and development assistance that is needed. For Somalis living as refu-
gees in the region, discrimination and the restrictions on movement 
(particularly in Kenya), as well as employment and land ownership 
policies imposed upon recognized refugees, further constrain people’s 
livelihoods.
The Global Commission on International Migration’s recommenda-
tions warn that, “Developing country policies should aim to generate 
adequate employment and rapid growth, rather than relying on migra-
tion as an alternative to development opportunities.”63 Other literature 
stresses the need to see remittances in a positive light rather than as a 
destabilizing or conflict-supporting mechanism. Jacobsen advises that, 
“Refugee policies and relief assistance would do well to incorporate 
the fact of remittance sending into their understanding of how best to 
help refugees, especially those who are the senders.”64
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One way to do this would be to maximize the impact of any assis-
tance sent to the country of origin for development purposes. When 
contributions to community development are made by the diaspora, 
their effectiveness can be enhanced by co-funding or matching fund-
ing from governments or development partners. In the Mexican states 
of Jalisco and Oaxaca, the government operates a matching fund pro-
gram. For every emigrant dollar, the state (and sometimes the munici-
pality) contributes an additional dollar. This funding mechanism has 
been applied to such community development projects as water taps, 
school construction, provision of community recreational facilities, and 
road improvement.65 A similar approach has been tried in Somaliland, 
where a group known as Somscan UK, composed of Somalis living in 
the U.K. and Scandinavian countries, collectively bought a block of 
land in the town of Burao. Supported by the Danish Refugee Council, 
the group applied for and received 600,000 Euros from the European 
Union for the rehabilitation of Burao water supplies and to upgrade 
primary and secondary schools in the town.66 This project was some-
what controversial since the funding was intended to help facilitate 
the return migration of the landowners, but it can also be argued that 
it had a positive impact on the local community and at the same time 
was seen as a worthwhile investment for the remitters.
Comparative, policy-oriented studies of remittance flows have 
tended to yield similar recommendations:
1)  Help cut the cost and bureaucratic difficulty of sending remittances;
2)  Help improve the legal status and relative level of integration of 
immigrants within the host society to help ensure that they are 
given equal access to employment and education markets; and
3)  Promote emigrant involvement in sending and planning for devel-
opment in their countries of origin.67
Some of these recommendations are not as relevant for Somalia as 
they may be for other countries. For instance, many countries must 
contend with high commission rates for transfer of resources. Somali 
Xawilaada have the benefit of low commission rates (and no interest 
rates for money held by the company for the recipient or sender, inter-
est being proscribed by the tenets of Islam). Similarly, in the absence 
of a recognized government, liberalization of the labor market and 
harmonization of development and migration policies, both key rec-
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ommendations of the GCIM report, are not as relevant as they are in 
countries where the government is functioning.
Ultimately, what is needed is an appreciation of the tremendous 
pressure that Somalis face to support their relatives, and the reasons 
that this obligation is important to them. Such an awareness should 
underlie the initiatives recommended above, and can hopefully lead to 
helping to relieve their burden in the long term.
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